For KEFiM, Soti Triantafyllou’s recent acquittal is a milestone in the struggle for the practical establishment of freedom of speech, demonstrating in an exemplary way the highly problematic content of the so-called anti-racist law and its potential to be used as a means of limiting freedom of speech.

 KEFiM has actively assisted in this case, covering a significant sum of Mrs. Triantafyllou’s legal fees in this fight, and is committed to continuing both through judicial activism and in the battlefield of ideas to vigorously defend freedom of speech and individual rights.

In regards to this, we asked the writer’s two attorneys, Athanasios Anagnostopoulos and Konstantinos Kalliris, to answer a few questions about this case and its implications for freedom of speech in our homeland. Here’s what they had to say:

Describe in a few words the process that led to Soti Triantafyllou’s acquittal.

K.K.: The process in the audience was short and did not take the form of a ‘Galileo trial’.

A.A.: The case originated in a lawsuit due to which the prosecutor, Mrs. Ntaikou, wrongfully exercised criminal prosecution. The case was referred to the One-Member Court of Appeal of Athens, where Mrs. Triantafyllou was acquitted on May 2, 2018. Her acquittal was legally enforceable.

How easy or difficult do you think it is to be unfairly condemned under the anti-racism law?

K.K. Indeed, it seems that Greek judges understand the risk of law enforcement in cases of simply expressing one’s opinion, especially from people who have a long history in public and/or scientific discussion. However, we mustn’t forget that, in similar cases, the process itself is a form of punishment. It acts as a method of intimidation and censorship, as it is easy for someone to submit as many complaints or reports as he/she wants, hoping to drive someone to the public. This is how not only the law but also the criminal justice itself is being used by groups of aspiring censors.

A.A.: Evidently it is easy to get prosecuted, but it is harder to get convicted. Because our courts continue to resist the legislative fallout of freedom of speech and in fact require much more than a simple expression of opinion in order to convict the accused. But the damage inflicted on freedom of opinion from the prosecution and referral is very great.

What does Soti Triantafyllou’s justification mean for the future of this law?

K.K.: Undoubtedly, this is a decision that will be a point of reference in the assessment of this law. But that should not lead us to over-optimistic conclusions. As we saw after Professor Richter’s acquittal, there are enough people in our country that have a hard time or simply refuse to see the issue in principle. On the contrary, they approach the issue of freedom of speech in terms of war, which allows them to persuade themselves that the silencing of certain people or opinions does not affect freedom of expression. These are the bastions of this law and there are a few. Mrs Triantafyllou’s case has brought to light the untreatable wounds that this law opened. Whether there is a cure – or rather a capable therapist, remains to be seen.

A.A.: Since she is a prominent writer and journalist, the dangers of this law was demonstrated even to those in denial, a law which, as many of us had predicted, has been used by every ambitious and distrustful accuser in order to impose the silencing of the opinions he doesn’t like. Mrs. Triantafyllou’s case has already acquired paramount importance in the struggle for the abolition of any intolerant legislation.

As legal and active citizens, what is your opinion on the usefulness of such laws?

K.K.: First of all, it should be stressed that our country was not obliged to apply what was described in the EU Council’s Framework Decision on combating certain forms and implementations of racism and xenophobia through criminal law if they were not compatible with the constitutional rights and the fundamental principles of Greek law. This (rare) possibility was given to the Member States precisely because of the specificity of such criminal laws. Unfortunately, the Greek legislator not only circumvented this suggestion, but ended up in an untenable legislative text, whose consequences we have been experiencing since. If a law is as good as its worst possible application, there is no doubt about how bad the so-called anti-racism is. Our criminal arsenal offers the possibility of tightening punishments of crimes committed with racist, homophobic, sexist and other similar moral debauchery motives, without creating pseudo-crimes that test the limits of penal doctrine and constitutional order.

A.A.: Those acts that were and should be punished have already been predicted as crimes by other provisions of the current legislation, often with exaggeration. As a result, the anti-racism law offers nothing on the merits, but solely the satisfaction of various ideals. This is a typical case of anti-liberal legislation that violates individual rights.

KEFiM’s judicial activism in this case has fully achieved its goal. In what other areas do you think this action is needed to protect individual freedoms against such laws?

K.K.: Defending liberal democracy takes place everywhere, including court rooms. Therefore, KEFiM’s support was important and fully in line with its mission. But, as I said before, the main battle must be taken to the section of ideals: it is more necessary than ever to highlight the moral, political and arguable nudity of the enemies of freedom and individual rights. KEFiM has the opportunity and the ability to lead this peaceful struggle against irrationality, populism and intolerance, however they mask themselves in any occasion.

A.A.: KEFiM’s support has been of great importance to both the accused and the defense. Our judicial victory opens the way for other struggles, so other similar accusations can be doubted and lose in court. By means of symbolic adoption, if I’m allowed to use this expression, of defendants in trials of great interest, where the rule of law is tested, KEFiM can actively contribute to the support of individual rights.